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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from judgments entered by
the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the panel majority of the Utah Court of Appeals erred in holding that the time
under the Utah Municipal Code ("UMC") for filing a petition for review of a municipal
appeal board order runs from the date appearing on the order, as opposed to from the date the
municipal recorder certifies the order as final.
Standard of Review: "On certiorari, [the Supreme Court] review[s] the decision of the
court of appeals for correctness, giving no deference to its conclusions of law." State ex rel
T.R, 2011 UT 51,1[16, 266 P.3d 739.
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 is of central importance to this appeal; its full text
appears in the addendum as Addendum "D."1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
On November 12, 2009, South Jordan City terminated the employment of officer,

Brett Perez, who had worked for fourteen years as a South Jordan Police Department police

!

The Utah legislature materially amended section 10-3-1106 effective May 8, 2012.
In this brief, Perez refers to and analyzes the version of section 10-3-1106 in effect at the
time he filed his July 9, 2010 appeal.
1
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officer. R. at 1-3, 53 (Tr. 2:25-3:1). The City based its termination on an incident that
occurred on May 28,2009, as well as prior disciplinary actions against Perez already on file.
R. at 1 -3. Perez appealed the termination to the South Jordan City Appeal Board under Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-1106.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The South Jordan City Appeal Board conducted a hearing regarding Perez's

termination on May 26,2010. Id, at 13-14,53. The Appeal Board upheld the City's decision
to terminate Perez's employment in a ruling entitled "Decision and Order" ("Order") and
bearing the date June 7,2010. R. at 52. The City's recorder, Anna West, certified the Order
as final on June 10,2010 and mailed notice of its certification to Perez on the same date. See
Addendum "C." Perez filed a petition for review with the Utah Court of Appeals on July 9,
2010 under Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1106 and 78A-4-103(2)(a). In a split decision, the Utah
Court of Appeals dismissed Perez's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The majority reasoned
i

that Perez's appeal was untimely because he filed it more than 30 days after the date
appearing on the Order. Judge Orme dissented, reasoning that Perez's appeal was timely
because he filed it within 30 days of the date the city recorder certified the Order as

final.

<

The Utah Court of Appeals' decision from which Perez appeals is reported as Perez
v. South Jordan City, 2011 UT App 430, 268 P.3d 87, case no. 20100545, decided on
\

December 15, 2011. A copy of that decision is attached as Addendum "A." The Appeal
Board Order dated June 7, 2010 is attached as Addendum "B."
<
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C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because the Utah Court of Appeals dismissed Perez's appeal for lack ofjurisdiction,

the pertinent facts are those relating to the timing of Perez's appeal.
Following an evidentiary hearing on the merits of Perez's termination, the Appeal
Board members signed the Order. The words "Dated this 7th day of June, 2010" appear above
the block containing the Appeal Board members' signatures. See Addendum "B." The Order
lacks any indication it is "final" or "official." Id. Similarly, the Order does not contain the
word "issued" (or any variation thereof), nor does it reflect a date of "issuance." Id. The last
paragraph of the Order states: "The board requests the City Recorder certify this decision in
accordance with the South Jordan City Employee Handbook." Id.
Although the Appeal Board appears to have signed the Order on June 7, 2010, it did
not immediately deliver the Order to Anna West, the South Jordan City Recorder, for
certification. Rather, it waited until June 10,2010 to do so. See Addendum "C" (indicating
the Appeal Board delivered the Order to Ms. West's office on June 10, 2010). In turn, Ms.
West mailed the Order and a cover letter to the parties' counsel on that same day. See id. Ms.
West's letter stated, in pertinent part:
Enclosed is a copy of the official Certified Decision & Order of the
Employee Appeals Board Hearing held May 26,2010 for Brett Perez v.
South Jordan City that was delivered to my office today, June 10,2010.
Section 4-06(5)e(4) of the South Jordan Employee Handbook states,
'any final action or order oj the board may be appealed by either the
employee or the City to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing with that

3
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court a notice oj appeal no later than 30 days from the date of the
issuance of the final action or order of the boards
See id. (emphasis in original). Ms. West's letter was the first document to describe the Order
as "official" and "[certified." See id. Perez filed his petition for review on July 9, 2010 29 days from the date Ms. West certified the Order as final and mailed it to the parties, but 32
days from the date the Appeal Board signed the Order.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Unlike other administrative schemes, the UMC contains a unique "certification" step.
Once a municipal appeal board has decided a matter, it must tender its decision to the
municipal recorder, which certifies the decision. The UMC then allows a party to appeal
"final" appeal board orders that have "issued." Unfortunately, the UMC does not define
either "final" or "issued."
With this background, Perez advances three arguments in this petition. First, Perez
argues a municipal recorder's certification of an appeal board order makes that order "final"
for appeal purposes under the UMC. Until certification has occurred, Perez asserts, the order
is subject to modification and therefore not appealable. Further, the municipal recorder serves
as an intermediary between the employee and the appeal board in virtually every step of the
appeal process. Thus, Perez's argument gives effect to the legislatively-mandated role of the
municipal recorder in the appeal process, while the Utah Court of Appeals' interpretation in

1

Perez does not.
i
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Second, Perez argues that certification by a municipal recorder is what constitutes
"issuance" of an appeal board order under the UMC. Certification by a municipal recorder
is analogous to a court clerk's entry of a court order pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(b)-(c).
This interpretation of the UMC again gives effect to the legislature's choice to require a
municipal recorder's involvement in the certification process. The Utah Court of Appeals'
application of court decisions interpreting Utah's Administrative Procedures Act-which does
not contain a certification process - renders the UMC's certification process superfluous.
Finally, Perez argues that his proposed interpretation of the UMC's certification
process advances Utah public policy that favors certainty, consistency, predictability, and
uniformity, especially for municipal employees who have a constitutional right to their
employment.

5
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED UTAH
CODE ANN. § 10-3-1106 REQUIRES A MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE DESIRING
TO APPEAL AN APPEAL BOARD ORDER TO FILE THAT APPEAL
WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DATE APPEARING ON THE ORDER, AS
OPPOSED TO WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DATE THE CITY RECORDER
CERTIFIES THE ORDER.
This Court should rule that the time for Perez to appeal the Order commenced on June

10, 2010, the date Ms. West certified the Order as final. Accordingly, this Court should
reverse the Court of Appeal's decision that Perez's July 9, 2010 appeal was untimely.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 allows a municipal employee to appeal his or her
termination of employment to a municipal appeal board. Id. at § 10-3-1106(2)(a). After an
evidentiary hearing, the appeal board must decide the matter by secret ballot. Id. at § 10-31106(5)(a)(i). The decision must then be certified to the municipality's recorder. Id. If an
employee wishes to appeal the decision, he or she must file a petition for review with the Utah
Court of Appeals "within 30 days after the issuance of the final action or order of the appeal
board." Id. at § 10-3-1106(6)(b).
The critical terms in subsection 10-3-1106(6)(b) and to this appeal are "issuance" and
"final." By the plain text of the statute, a municipal employee may only appeal an appeal
board order that is both "issue[d]" and "final." See id. Unfortunately, the UMC does not
define either term.

1

Perez submits that an appeal board order becomes "final" when it is certified by a
municipal recorder. Perez also submits that certification of an order by a municipal recorder
i

6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

constitutes "issuance" of that order under the statute. As will be shown below, Perez's
arguments are faithful to the plain text of the UMC, the City's policies, Utah case law, and
sound policy considerations.
A.

A Municipal Recorder's Certification of an Appeal Board Order Converts
the Order into a "Final" Order Appealable under Utah Code Ann, § 10-31106 and South Jordan City Policy,

This Court should rule that a municipal recorder's certification of an appeal board
order renders that order "final" under § 10-3-1106(6)(a) and South Jordan City policy.
A municipal employee may only appeal "[a] final action or order of the appeal
board[,]" provided the employee does so "within 30 days after the issuance of the final action
or order of the appeal board." See Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1106(6)(a) & (b). But what
causes an appeal board order to become "final" and therefore appealable? The UMC, City
policy, and Ms. West's June 10 communication answer that a municipal recorder's
certification is the act that renders an appeal board order "final."
Both the UMC and City policy plainly require certification of an appeal board's order
by a municipal recorder. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(5)(a)(i) ("Each decision of the appeal
board . . . shall be certified to the recorder

") (emphasis added); South Jordan Employee

Handbook, § 4-06(5)(e)(2) ("Each decision of the Appeals Board shallbe certified to the City
Recorder . . . . ) " (emphasis added). Because certification is both a mandatory and discrete
component of the statutory appeal process, the legislature must have intended it to serve an
important purpose.

7
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Furthermore, until an appeal board order has been certified, that order is subject to
change or modification by the appeal board. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 (nowhere
prohibiting a municipal appeal board from modifying an action or order prior to certification
to the municipal recorder). Perhaps the Appeal Board in this case was contemplating revision
and thus held onto the Order for three days2 before tendering it to Ms. West. In any event, an
order that is subject to change is not appealable. On the other hand, once an order has been
certified by the municipal recorder, there is no practical way for the appeal board to modify
it. Therefore, Perez submits that certification must be the act that converts an appeal board
order into a "final" appealable one.
Both the Order and the June 10, 2010 letter from Anna West support this conclusion.
The Order reads in pertinent part:
The Board hereby affirms the decision of Chief Shepherd to terminate
OfficerPerez' employment with South Jordan City. The Board requests
the City Recorder certify this decision in accordance with the South
Jordan City Employee Handbook.
See Addendum "B" at 18 (emphasis added). Thus, as of June 7, 2010, certification had not
occurred. Id. Contrast this with Ms. West's letter, which reads in relevant part:
Enclosed is a copy of the official Certified Decision & Order of the
Employee Appeals Board Hearing held May 26,2010 for Brett Perez v.
South Jordan City that was delivered to my office today, June 10,2010.

2

June 7,2010 was a Monday. Thus, the three-day interim between the Appeal Board's
June 7, 2010 dating of the Order and June 10, 2010 delivery of the same to Ms. West for
certification was not due to an intervening weekend.
8
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i

Section 4-06(5)(e)(4) of the South Jordan Employee Handbook states,
'any final action or order oj the board may be appealed by either the
employee or the City to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing with that
court a notice of appeal no later than 30 days from the date of the
issuance of the final action or order of the board.'
See Addendum "C" (boldface italics added; italics in original). In other words, certification
had occurred as of June 10.
By juxtaposing information about the "official'' and "[certified" character of the Order
with information on how to appeal "any final action or order of the board[,]" Ms. West's letter
suggests that, as of June 10, the Order was "final" for purposes of appeal. See id. Put another
way, Ms. West's letter communicated that her certification of the Order changed its character
in a meaningful way to Perez.
Based on the foregoing, this Court should rule that Ms. West's June 10, 2010
certification of the Order converted it into a "final" appealable order under the UMC.
B.

A Municipal Recorder's Certification of a Final Appeal Board Order
Constitutes "Issuance" of that Order under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106.

The Court of Appeals held the Order was "issued" on June 7, 2010, the date that
appears on the last page of the Order, and that Perez's appeal 32 days later was untimely. See
Perez, 2011 UT App 430, at ^8. This Court should reverse and rule that the Order was
"issued" on June 10, 2010, the date Ms. West certified the Order as final.
Both the UMC and South Jordan City Policy required Perez to file his appeal within
30 days of the "issuance" of the Appeal Board's "final" Order. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-3-1106(6)(b); South Jordan Employee Handbook § 4-06(5)(e)(4). Unfortunately, neither
9
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the Utah Code nor City policy explains what constitutes "issuance." Furthermore, the Order
itself is largely unhelpful. Although above the signature block are the words "Dated this 7th
day of June, 2010," the Order does not contain any variation of the word "issued" or otherwise
identify a date of "issuance." See Addendum "B."
Section 10-3-1106fs scheme, however, supports Perez's argument that certification of
an order by a municipal recorder constitutes "issuance" of that order. Under the UMC, a
municipal employee commences an appeal of discipline by filing a written appeal to the
municipal recorder.3 See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(3)(a) ("Each appeal under Subsection
(2) shall be taken by filing written notice of the appeal with the municipal recorder within
10 days after . . . the discharge, suspension, or involuntary transfer.") (emphasis added).
Upon receiving an employee's appeal, the municipal recorder must refer the appeal to
the municipal appeal board. Id at § 10-3-1106(3)(b)(i) ("Upon filing of an appeal under
Subsection (3)(a), the municipal recorder shall forthwith refer a copy of the appeal to the
appeal board."). And after hearing and deciding the matter, the appeal board is required to
certify its decision to the municipal recorder. See id. at §§ 10-3-1106(3)(b)(ii) & (5)(a)(i).
Save for the evidentiary hearing itself, there is no statutory mechanism for direct
communication between an appealing employee and a municipal appeal board. Indeed, the

3

South Jordan policy contains a similar requirement. See South Jordan Employee
Handbook § 4-06(5)(a) ("Appeals to the Appeal Board shall be taken by filing written notice
of the appeal with the City Recorder within ten days of receipt of the notice of the imposition
of the suspension . . . , demotion or involuntary transfer... or termination .. ..") (emphasis
added).
10
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Utah legislature chose to position a municipal recorder as a required intermediary in virtually
every step of the appeal process.4 It follows, then, that the municipal recorder's certification
of an appeal board order is the final communication that not only ends the appeal board
appeals process but also triggers the next appeals process.5 In other words, the certification
step constitutes "issuance" of an appealable order under § 10-3-1106(6)(b), triggering the
employee's right to appeal to the court of appeals within 3 0 days. See id. Perez's July 9,2010
appeal would have been timely under this approach.
The Utah Court of Appeals held the June 7,2010 date on the Order was the "issuance"
date of the Order, and that Perez's July 9, 2010 appeal was thus untimely. Perez, 2011 UT
App 430, at f4. In so holding, the Court of Appeals relied upon this Court's decisions
interpreting the Utah Administrative Procedures Act,6 ultimately concluding "We see no
reason to interpret the Utah Municipal Code any differently." Id.7

4

In South Jordan, the city recorder even "records and takes minutes of each [appeal
board hearing] session, except for the Appeal Board's deliberations." South Jordan
Employee Handbook § 4-06(5)(d)(3).
Essentially, Perez argues municipal recorders in UMC appeals serve a similar role
as clerks in the judicial system. Both handle filing of the parties' papers, communications
between the parties and the tribunal, and entry of final actions, orders, and judgments.
including this Court's pronouncement "that the date the order constituting the final
agency action issues is the date the order bears on its face." See Perez, 2011 UT App 430,
at | 4 (citing Dusty % Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm yn, 842 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1992) (per
curiam) (construing Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1989)).
7

The Court of Appeals also relied upon Silva v. Dept. of Employment Sec., 786 P.2d
246 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), for its rule that filing deadlines should be measured by the date
a decision is issued rather than the date it is mailed. See Perez, 2011 UT App 430, at f4.
11
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This Court should reject the Court of Appeals' holding for several reasons. First, there
is "a reason to interpret the [UMC] differently than the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
(UAPA). The UAPA does not include a provision like the UMC provision that imposes a
certification step." See Perez, 2011 UT App 430, at ^[10 (Orme, J., dissenting); Utah Code
Ann. §§ 63G-4-301-302 & -401 (none mandating a certification process). Certification was
obviously important to the legislature, yet the Court of Appeals' ruling renders it superfluous.
The Court of Appeals' ruling thus runs afoul of several cardinal rules of statutory
interpretation.
[W]e are compelled to give the statutory language meaning and to
assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly. Thus, we
construe statutory enactments in a way that renders all parts thereof
relevant and meaningful. We also avoid an interpretation which renders
portions of, or words in, a statute superfluous or inoperative . . . .
See Andreason v. Felsted, 2006 UT App 188, ^[18, 137 P.3d 1 ( (internal quotations and
citations omitted); HaroldSelman, Inc. v. Box Elder County, 2011 UT 18, ^fl8,251 P.3d 804
(the Supreme Court stating the "primary objective in interpreting a statute is to give effect to
the intent of the legislature.") (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Second, this Court should, as Judge Orme suggests, view the "UMC' s requirement that

<

the [appeal board's] decision be certified to the City Recorder [as] analogous to the
requirement that judgments be filed with the court clerk before they become final and
i

appealable." See Perez, 2011 UT App 430, at ^f 10 (Orme, J., dissenting) (citing Utah R. Civ.
P. 58A(b)-(c) for its explanation that a "judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered
(

12
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for all purposes . . . when it is signed [by the judge] and filed [with the clerk") (emphasis
added). Unlike the ruling mPerez, Judge Orme's view gives effect to the legislature's choice
to include the recorder as a key intermediary between appeal boards and municipal employees.
Third, the Court of Appeals improperly relied upon Silva. In that case, the appellant
had until October 25 to appeal an Industrial Commission Board of Review decision. The
appellant mailed his notice of appeal on October 23 but the court did not receive it until
October 26. 786 P.2d at 246. Silva argued his 30-day appeal deadline should be extended
because he received the Industrial Commission's decision in the mail days after it had been
decided. Id. at 247.8 The Court of Appeals rejected that argument, stating "[t]he appeal time
commences when the final agency order issues and not when allegedly received by a party.
Nor can the thirty-day time be extended three days because the agency mailed a copy to the
petitioner." Id.
Silva has no application to this matter. Perez has never argued, nor does he argue here,
that Ms. West's mailing of the Order to him should extend his appeal time. Additionally,
Silva provides zero guidance on what constitutes the "issuance" of a final appeal board order
under the UMC. The Silva court, like the Court of Appeals in Perez, relied on UAPA for its
"issuance" determination. See 786 P.2d at 247 (referencing Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-

8

Silva also argued his appeal was timely because it should be deemed filed on the date
he mailed it, not the date the court received it. Silva, 786 P.2d at 247. The Court of Appeals
rejected this argument, stating "[t]he argument that an appeal is filed when mailed has been
consistently rejected in the p a s t . . . . " Id. However, this aspect of Silva is unhelpful to the
instant matter because Perez did not mail his petition for review.
13
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14(3)(a)).9 UAPA does not contain the UMC's certification requirement, so Silva does not,
by itself, support the Court of Appeals' dismissal of Perez's appeal as untimely.
Based on the foregoing, this Court should rule that a municipal recorder's certification
of an appeal board order constitutes "issuance" of that order and triggers a petitioner's appeal
right under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6)(b) on the certification date. Accordingly, this
Court should reverse the Court of Appeals' ruling that Perez's July 9, 2010 appeal was
untimely, as he filed it within 30 days of Ms. West's June 10 certification of the Order.
IL

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION
IN PEREZ TO PROMOTE CERTAINTY AND UNIFORMITY RESPECTING
APPEAL RIGHTS UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-3-1106.
Sound policy dictates that a petitioner filing an appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-

1106(6) should be readily able to ascertain when his or her appeal opportunity commences and
ends. See Silva, 786 P.2d at 247 (the Utah Court of Appeals rejecting a rule that "would
render uncertain the time for appeal

"). Indeed, promoting certainty in appeal rights and

deadlines is particularly important for persons who have a constitutional right in their
employment, as municipal employees do.10
Utah public policy supports rules that promote consistency, uniformity, and

{

predictability. See Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis, Inc. v. Davis County Clerk, 2007

9

Which is now codified at §63G-4-401.

1

10

Police officers have a recognized property right in their employment, and, like other
municipal employees, are entitled to adequate due process in connection with the suspension
or termination of their employment. Becker v. Sunset City, 2009 UT App 197, f6, 216 P.3d
367.
14
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UT 97, ^|8, 175 P.3d 1036 (this Court identifying consistency, predictability, and uniformity
as important public policies); Searle v. Milburn Irrigation Co., 2006 UT 16, f 18, 133 P.3d
382 (same). It follows that public policy would support uniform treatment of similarlysituated appellants. One appellant seeking review under a discrete statute should be afforded
the same rights as all other appellants appealing under that statute.
The Perez decision contravenes the above policies in at least two ways. First, the
Court of Appeals' holding that the time for appeal begins to run on the date reflected on an
appeal board order will likely result in great uncertainty for future appellants. Judge Orme
provided some examples in his dissent:
It may be that my view11 actually promotes greater certainty [than
the majority's view]. In this case, there was a blank for the day in June
when the order was signed. Someone - one of the three signatories,
presumably - penned in "7." It is admittedly a legible, distinct seven in
this case. But what if it looked like it could be a one or a seven? Or
what if the signatories neglected to fill In the blank? Or what if the copy
mailed to Perez bore one hand-written date and the copy in the Board's
file bore a different one? The uncertainty resulting from such ambiguity
would be eliminated by reliance on the more straightforward
certification date.
Id. at TJ12 n.2 (Orme, J., dissenting). This Court should favor Judge Orme's view, which
Perez adopts in this petition, over the Court of Appeals's ruling that allows ambiguities to
render uncertain municipal appellants' appeal rights.

u

"[T]hat issuance [under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6)(b)] equates to the date a
signed order is certified
" See Perez, 2011 UT App 430, ^12 (Orme, J., dissenting).
15
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Second, the Court of Appeals' decision has narrow application and is unhelpful to any
situation involving a decision-to-certification delay of more than three or less than 15 days.
Future petitioners in Perez's shoes would have to litigate any delay more than three days and
future courts would have to find some way of determining whether a nine-day delay, for
example, is more prejudicial than a three-day delay, and why.
Perez's proposed rule - that the time to appeal an appeal board's order under Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6) begins to run upon the municipal recorder's certification of that
order - would eliminate the Court of Appeals's concern "that a lengthy delay [between
execution and certification] could conceivably result in the violation of a petitioner's statutory
right to seek judicial review

" Perez, 2011 UT App 430, at ^[6. Therefore, based on the

foregoing, this Court should rule that Perez's proposed certification-constitutes-"issuance"
rule promotes greater certainty and uniformity than the Court of Appeals' date of orderconstitutes-"issuance" rule. This Court should adopt Perez's proposed rule accordingly.
CONCLUSION
This Court should rule that a municipal recorder's certification both renders an appeal
board order "final" and constitutes "issuance" of that order under § 10-3-1106(6), thereby
triggering that section's 30-day appeal right. Accordingly, Perez respectfully requests that this
Court vacate the Court of Appeals' dismissal of Perez's appeal and remand the matter for
further consideration.

(
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DATED this J_\_ day of May 2012.
KESLER&RUST

Brett Perez
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
Brett PEREZ, Petitioner,
v.
SOUTH JORDAN CITY, a Utah municipal corporation; and South Jordan City Appeal Board, Respondents.
No. 20100545-CA.
Dec. 15,2011.
Background: Employee sought review of decision
of city appeal board upholding termination of his
employment by city.
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Davis, P.J., held
that decision became final when order was issued,
rather than when decision was certified to the city
recorder.
Appeal dismissed.

of issuance, mailing of the decision within three
days of its issuance was sufficiently prompt and did
not result in a violation of employee's statutory
right to seek judicial review of the decision, and
mailed notice expressly notified employee of filing
deadline for judicial review. West's U.C.A. §
10-3-1106(6)(a-b).
[2] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A €^>
722.1
15 A Administrative Law and Procedure
][ 5AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(C) Proceedings for Review
15Ak722 Time for Proceedings
15Ak722.1 k. In general. Most Cited
Cases
The timely filing of petitions of judicial review
is jurisdictional.
[3] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A C^>
723

Orme, J., dissented and filed opinion.
West Headnotes
[1] Municipal Corporations 268 €=>218(9)
268 Municipal Corporations
268V Officers, Agents, and Employees
268V(C) Agents and Employees
268k218 Removal, Discharge, Transfer or
Demotion
268k218(9) k. Review. Most Cited
Cases
Decision of city appeal board upholding the
termination of employee's employment by city became final for purposes of judicial review on the
date appeal board issued its order, rather than when
decision was certified to the city recorder; the certification of the order to the city recorder was merely
a step in the process of notifying the employee of
the board's decision, it did nothing to delay the date

15A Administrative Law and Procedure
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
15AV(C) Proceedings for Review
15Ak722 Time for Proceedings
15Ak723 k. Effect of delay. Most
Cited Cases
Failure to timely file a petition for judicial review results in dismissal.
*878 Ryan B. Hancey, Salt Lake City, for Petitioner.
Camille N. Johnson and Maralyn M. English, Salt
Lake City, for Respondents.
Before Judges DAVIS, ORME, and VOROS.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
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DAVIS, Presiding Judge:
U 1 Brett Perez contests the decision of the
South Jordan City Appeal Board (the Board) upholding the termination of his employment with
South Jordan City. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
T[ 2 The Utah Municipal Code provides that
"[a] final action or order of the appeal board may
be reviewed by the Court of Appeals by filing with
that court a petition for review," which must "be
filed within 30 days after the issuance of the final
action or order of the appeal board." Utah Code
Ann. § 10-3-1106(6)(a)-(b) (Supp.2011). The decision of the Board in this case was dated June 7,
2010, and states, "The Board requests the City Recorder certify this decision in accordance with the
South Jordan City Employee Handbook." See generally id. § 10-3-1106(5)(a)(I) ("Each decision of
the appeal board ... shall be certified to the recorder
within 15 days from the date the matter is referred
to it...."); City of South Jordan Employee Handbook § 4-06(5)(e)(2), available at http:// sjc. Utah,
gov/ pdf/ HR- Employee Handbook, pdf (same).
The City Recorder received the decision on June
10, 2010, and immediately mailed it to Perez with
an accompanying letter notifying him that he could
seek appellate review by filing "a notice of appeal
no later than 30 days from the date of the issuance
of the final action or order of the [B]oard." Perez
filed a petition for review in this court on July 9,
2010.
[1] K 3 Perez contends that his petition for review was timely filed in this court because the time
for appeal did not begin until the decision was certified to the City Recorder. Respondents, South
Jordan City and the Board, maintain that the decision was issued as of the date of the order and
that Perez's petition for review was due no later
than July 7, 2010. We agree with Respondents.
f 4 We have previously stressed the importance
of establishing clear deadlines for appeals, a policy
that is advanced by measuring filing deadlines from
the date a decision is issued rather than the date it is

mailed. See Silva v. Department of Emp't Sec, 786
P.2d 246, 247 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (mem.) (per
curiam) (rejecting a proposed rule that "would
render uncertain the time for appeal in virtually
every case"). Perez attempts to distinguish his case
by asserting that the decision of the Board could
not be considered "issued" until it was certified to
the City Recorder. However, in construing the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act our supreme court
has held "that the date the order constituting the final agency action issues is the date the order bears
on its face." Dusty's, Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 842 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1992) (per curiam) (construing Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a)
(1989) (current version at id. § 63G-4-401(3)(a)
(2008))). We see no reason to interpret the Utah
Municipal Code any differently.
*879 f 5 While the Utah Municipal Code states
that the Board's decision "shall be certified to the
recorder within 15 days from the date the matter is
referred to it," see Utah Code Ann. §
10-3-1106(5)(a)(I), this requirement merely
provides a deadline for the Board to certify its decision to the recorder; it does not add an additional
requirement for issuance to be complete. Like the
mailing of an order, which we have held on several
occasions does not extend the time for filing a petition for review, see Bonded Bicycle Couriers v. Department of Emp't Sec, 844 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah
Ct.App.1992) (per curiam); Silva, 786 P.2d at 247;
see also Dusty's, 842 P.2d at 870, the certification
of the order to the City Recorder is merely a step in
the process of notifying the petitioner of the
Board's decision. It does nothing to delay the date
of issuance.
| 6 Perez argues that this interpretation results
in a violation of his right to seek judicial review because he had no access to the Board's decision until
after it was mailed to him by the City Recorder. He
argues that "[i]f the time between execution and
certification of a decision applies toward the time
for appeal, nothing would prevent an appeal board
from holding a decision for twenty-nine days, giv-
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ing a potential appellant just one day in which to
timely appeal." We agree with Perez that a lengthy
delay could conceivably result in the violation of a
petitioner's statutory right to seek judicial review
and observe that a delay of any more than fifteen
days would violate the plain language of section
10-3-1106(5)(a)(I). However, a violation of the petitioner's right to statutory review does not automatically follow every time there is a gap of any length
between the issuance of the decision and its certification and mailing. Cf. Buczynski v. Industrial
Comm'n, 917 P.2d 552, 555 (Utah 1996) (holding
that where a decision of the Industrial Commission
was not mailed until after the time for filing a petition for review had passed and petitioner's counsel
promptly filed the petition upon receiving notice of
the order, petitioner's statutory right to judicial review could not be denied based on the expiration of
the thirty-day period). The City Recorder's mailing
of the decision within three days of its issuance was
sufficiently prompt and did not result in a violation
of Perez's statutory right to seek judicial review of
the decision.
f 7 We are also not persuaded by Perez's argument that the City Recorder's letter could have reasonably misled him into believing that the time for
filing a petition for review commenced as of the
date of the letter rather than the date of the order.
The decision, a copy of which was enclosed with
the letter, was clearly dated June 7, 2010. The City
Recorder's letter states that a copy of the decision
"was delivered to [the City Recorder's] office ...
June 10, 2010," but then goes on to explain that a
notice of appeal must be filed "no later than 30
days from the date of the issuance of the final action or order of the board." (Internal quotation
marks and additional emphasis omitted); see also
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6)(b). Nothing in the
letter equates the date of issuance with the date of
delivery to the City Recorder. It was not reasonable
for Perez to simply assume that he could rely on the
date of the letter rather than the date of the order in
calculating the time for filing a petition for review.
Furthermore, we disagree with Perez that the City

Recorder had any obligation to point out "the time
lag between the date of the order and date of its certification" or to "advise Perez that his appeal window [was] less than 30 days due to such delay."
[2] [3] f 8 Because the thirty-day time period
for filing a petition for review of the Board's decision commenced as of the date of the order—June
7, 2010—Perez's petition for review, filed on July
9, 2010, was untimely. "[T]he timely filing of petitions of review ... is jurisdictional," Leonczynski v.
Board of Review, 713 P.2d 706, 706-07 (Utah
1985) (mem.), "and failure to timely file results in
dismissal," Blauer v. Department of Workforce
Servs., 2007 UT App 280, % 7, 167 P.3d 1102. See
also Silva, 786 P.2d at 247. Accordingly, we dismiss this case. See generally Varian-Eimac, Inc. v.
Lamoreaux, 161 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct.App.1989)
("When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it
*880 retains only the authority to dismiss the action.").
H 9 I CONCUR: J. FREDERIC VOROS JR., Judge.
ORME, Judge (dissenting):
1[ 10 I dissent. Unlike the majority, I do see a
reason to interpret the Utah Municipal Code (the
UMC) differently from the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act (UAPA). UAPA does not include a
provision like the UMC provision that imposes a
certification step. I think the UMC's requirement
that the decision be certified to the City Recorder is
analogous to the requirement that judgments be
filed with the court clerk before they become final
and appealable. See Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(b)-(c)
(explaining that a "judgment is complete and shall
be deemed entered for all purposes ... when it is
signed [by the judge] and filed [with the clerk]")
(emphasis added); Willden Family Dental, Inc. v.
Cannon, 2007 UT App 404U, para. 3, 2007 WL
4443005 (mem.) (per curiam) (holding that "[e]ntry
of a final, appealable judgment ... occurred when
the order granting summary judgment was both
signed by the district court judge and filed with the
clerk").
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TI 11 If a judge signs a judgment on June 7, but
it is not filed by the court clerk until June 10, the
judgment is effective on June 10. See Willden Family Dental, Inc., 2007 UT App 404U, para. 4, 2007
WL 4443005. The Board in this case may have
signed its decision on June 7, but the statutorily required certification to the city recorder could not
have happened until June 10, the day the City Recorder indicated in her transmittal letter to Perez
that the decision was delivered to her and the day
on which she mailed what she characterized as "a
copy of the official Certified Decision & Order" to
Perez.
FN1. The majority takes comfort in a per
curiam memorandum decision, Silva v. Department of Employment Security, 786
P.2d 246 (Utah Ct.App.1990). Unlike the
petitioner in Silva, however, Perez is not
claiming that the fact his copy was mailed
on June 10, but did not reach him until
later, means his appeal time was extended.
See id. at 247. Instead, Perez focuses his
attention on certification, which is much
more analogous to a clerk filing a court's
final order than it is to mailing notice of an
immediately effective decision. In Silva,
we were apparently concerned about the
uncertainty that would ensue if petitioners
used the date on which a decision was
mailed or on which they received a decision in the mail as the starting date for
appeal and judicial review deadlines, and
we held that the starting date has to be
"when the final agency order issues and
not when [it is] allegedly received by a
party." Id. In line with Silva, Perez acknowledges his appeal time started to run
on June 10, with certification to the city recorder, not at some later date when he received the decision.

the
statute. See
Utah
Code
Ann.
§
10-3-1106(5)(a)(i) (Supp.2011). The uncertainty
my colleagues worry about is simply not presented
by this case. Holding to my view—that issuance
equates to the date a signed order is certified—promotes just as much certainty as the majority's view that issuance equates to the date of signing by the Board.
And my view recognizes, as
did the Board, the importance of statutorily manFN3
dated certification.
FN2. It may actually be that my view promotes greater certainty. In this case, there
was a blank for the day in June when the
order was signed. Someone—one of the
three signatories, presumably—penned in
"7." It is admittedly a legible, distinct seven in this case. But what if it looked like it
could be a one or a seven? Or what if the
signatories neglected to fill in the blank?
Or what if the copy mailed to Perez bore
one hand-written date and the copy in the
Board's file bore a different one? The uncertainty resulting from such ambiguity
would be eliminated by reliance on the
more straightforward certification date.
FN3. The Board's decision ends with the
request that "the City Recorder certify this
decision." And, as noted, the recorder also
appreciated the importance of this step,
taking pains in her transmittal letter to
refer to the copy enclosed for Perez as "a
copy of the official Certified Decision &
Order."
Utah App.,2011.
Perez v. South Jordan City
268 P.3d 877, 697 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 2011 UT
App 430
END OF DOCUMENT

If 12 Decision "issuance" under the UMC did
not ripen until the decision was certified to the City
Recorder, as required by the mandatory language of
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SOUTH JORDAN CITY BOARD OF APPEALS
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In Re: Termination of Brett Perez
DECISION AND ORDER

INTRODUCTION
On the date of May 26-27,2010, the above entitled matter came before the South
Jordan City Appeals Board ("Board") for a hearing to review a decision issued by the South
Jordan City Police Chief Lindsay Shepherd ("Chief Shepherd") to tenninate Officer Brett Perez
("Officer Perez"), Chief Shepherd's decision to terminate Officer Perez followed a predisciplinary hearing which was conducted by Chief Shepherd on the date of November 4,2009
pursuant to the South Jordan City Employee Handbook § 4-06 (4), Chief Shepherd's decision to
terminate Officer Perez was issued on the date of NovemI>er 12,2009, for an incident which
occurred on the date of May 28,2009, wherein Officer Perez was found by the South Jordan
Police Department to have engaged in a high speed police pursuit in a manner which violated the
South Jordan Police Department and Policy and Procedures Manual, Chapter 26.1,1 Regulation 7
- Unsatisfactory Performance; and Chapter 26.1.1 Code of Conduct Regulation 42 Performance of Duty. Officer Perez appealed Chief Shepherd's decision to terminate him.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
There are two basic issues for the Board to consider when reviewing a decision to
discipline or terminate an employee: 1) whether sufficient evidence exists to support the
allegation of employee misconduct; and 2) whether the discipline imposed is appropriate, or
proportionate to the severity of the misconduct. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 10-3-1106 (7) (a),
"the procedure for conducting an appeal and the standard of review shall be prescribed by the
governing body of each municipality by ordinance." Under the South Jordan City Employee
Handbook, § 4*06 (5) d. 5), the standard of review to be applied in this case "is a preponderance
of the evidence," Thus the Board applies the "preponderance of the evidence" standard to the
question of whether the allegations described in Chief Shepherd's November 12,2009
termination letter are supported by sufficient evidence.
%Ttah law has provided little guidance on the precise factors used to balance the
proportionality of the punishment to the offense/5 Ogden City Corp, v. Harmon, 2005 UT App
274, P18 (Utah a . App. 2005) In the Ogden City case, the Utah Court of Appeals reviewed a
decision by the Ogden Civil Service Commission to not terminate afirefighter,who was
investigated by the Ogden City Fire Department for sundry acts of misconduct The variety of
instances where misconduct was found to have occurred led the Utah Court of Appeals to
remand this case to the Ogden Civil Service Commission, with direction to evaluate more closely
whether the misconduct warranted termination. Id. At PI 5.

'

The statue which governs Ogden Civil Service Commission (Utah Code Ann. § 10-31012) differsfromthe operative statute which governs the Board (Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106).
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However, the principles established in the Ogden City case for evaluating the proportionality of
punishment to misconduct also guide the Board's review of v&ether Chief Shepherd's decision
to terminate Officer Perez is proportionate to his misconduct These principles include:
[A]n exemplary service record and tenuous evidence of misconduct may tip the
balance against terminatiocL On the other hand, dishonesty, or a series of
violations accompanied by apparently ineffectiive progressive discipline may
support termination. .,. Other courts have given weight to considerations of (a)
whether the violation is directly related to the employee's official duties and
significantly impedes his or her ability to cany out those duties; (b) whether the
offense was of a type that adversely affects the public confidence in the
department; (c) whether the offense undermines the morale and effectiveness of
the department; or (d) whether the offense was committed willfully or knowingly,
rather than negligently or inadvertently. See 5 i^ntieau on Local Gov't Law, §
79.11[4], [5] (2002); Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations §
12.237 (3d ed. 1999); 15A Am. Jur. 2d Civil Service §§ 50, 65 (2000). Courts
have further considered whether the misconduct is likely to reoccur. See Skelly v.
State Pers. Bd., 15 CaL 3d 194,124 CaL Rptr, 14> 539P.2d 774,791 (CaL 1975).
Ogden City, 2005 UT App 274, PI 8, After evaluating the fads of this case to determine
whether termination of Officer Perez is proportionate to the severity of his misconduct,
the Board may reverse Chief Shepherd' s choice of discipline as unduly excessive "only
when the punishment is "clearly disproportionate" to the offense,... and "exceeds the
bounds of reasonableness and rationality.'7" Ogden City, 2005 UT App 274, P17 (Utah
Ct App. 2005) [Quoting: In re Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d at 1363].

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE RECEIVED BY SOUTH JORDAN CITY
APPEALS BOARD
On the Date of May 26,2010, the Board received into evidence: 1) a booklet of exhibits
submitted by Officer Perez, Nos. 1-20; 2) a booklet of exiiibits submitted by South Jordan City,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
3 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Nos. 1-17, and video recordings from events which involved Officer Perez on the dates of April
1,2008 and May 28,2009* The Board has also heard TestimonyfromOfficer Perez, Sergeant
Whitaker,Chief Shepherd, City Manager John Geilmann, and Ryan Loose. Having considered
the evidence received on May 26,2010, and having considered introductory statements and the
arguments of the parties, the Board herebyfindsthe following facts, by a preponderance of the
evidence;

ggVDINGS[OF FACT RELEVANT TO MISCONDUCT ON MAY 28,2009,

L

Officer Perez was on duty as a patrol officer for the South Jordan Police

Department during the early morning hours of May 28,2009. At approximately 0130 hours
Officer Perez hears sergeant Crist report over the police radio that he has identified a suspicious
vehicle at the Family Motor Sports business in the Wal Mart Complex, South Jordan, Utah,
Soon after identifying the suspicious vehicle, Sergeant Crist reports the vehicle has sped away
from its initial location with its headlights turned off. The vehicle was last seen driving east on
9800 South at 3200 West
2.

Officer Perez responded to this report by driving to the location of 9800 South

2700 West Officer Perez' vehicle was facing west on 9800 South Street at this location. By the
time he reached this location, Officer Perez was advised by Sergeant Crist that the vehicle's
description was a dark green SUV.
3,

Officer Perez soon identified a vehicle traveling eastbound toward him. on 9800

South. Officer Perez initiated his emergency equipment and drove toward the suspect to initiate
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a traffic stop, but the vehicle continued to drive past Officer Perez andtamednorthbound on
27GGWest
4*

Officer Perez pursued the suspect for a limited distance on 2700 West, but

terminated pursuit upon determining the vehicle would not stop in response to Officer Perez'
pursuit. As Officer Perez disengaged the pursuit, Officer Perez noticed the vehicle turn east into
a neighborhood at approximately 9400 South, This neighborhood is accessible onlyfrom2700
West, Because Officer Perez determined the suspect vehicle would need to come back to 2700
West in order to escape the area, Officer Perez drove to the location of 9435 South 2700 West.
Once at this location, Officer Perez again identified the suspect vehicle attempting to leave the
area, but in reaction to Officer Perez5 arrival, the suspect drove the vehicle in reverse on 9435
South and attempted to conceal himself in a cul de sac at 2625 West,
5.

Officer Perez entered the cul de sac and soon identified the suspect vehicle parked

in a yard with its lights turned off Officer Perez exited Ids patrol vehicle with weapon drawn
and ordered the suspect driver to stop. The suspect driver then activated his headlights and drove
toward Officer Perez; however, the vehicle soon changed, direction southward, drove to the end
of the cul de sac, and began to turn around. Officer Nichols arrived in his patrol vehicle at this
time.
6.

Officer Perez waived Officer Nichols past him to enable pursuit of the suspect.

As Officer Nichols drove in the direction of the end of the cul de sac, Officer Perez positioned
himself in the road in an effort to block the suspect's escape. Officer Nichols was not successful
in stopping the suspect vehicle in the cul de sac, and the suspect vehicle returned in the direction
of Officer Perez. While standing in the approaching vehicle's pathway, Officer Perez pointed his
duty weapon at the approaching vehicle, but the vehicle did not stop. Rather, the suspect vehicle

5
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drove directly at Officer Perez as he stood in the roadway at 2625 West. Officer Perez was
forced to jump out of the way of the suspect vehicle to avoid being struck.
7.

The suspect vehicle headed westbound on 9435 South, a residential street,

through 2700 West and continued westbound until the suspect vehicle reached 3200 West,
whereupon the suspect vehicle headed north. During this time, Officer Nichols remained in
close pursuit of the vehicle, and periodically called out the suspect's location. As the suspect
vehicle escaped the area of the cul de sac at 2625 West, Officer Perez returned to his patrol
vehicle and attempted to rejoin Officer Nichols' pursuit However, Officer Perez stated that he
could not immediately rejoin Officer Nichols in his pursuit of the suspect vehicle because by the
time he was again operating his patrol vehicle, the suspect vehicle has nearly reached 3200 West
on 9435 south. Officer Perez elected to not follow the suspect vehicle on 9435 South, and
instead heads northbound on 2700 West, in case the suspect vehicle changes direction to the east
again.
8;

In order to keep pace with the pursuit of the suspect vehicle, Officer Perez attains

speeds of up to 70 miles per hour. The speed limit for this area is 35 miles per hour.
9.

While travelling North on 2700 West, Officer Perez does not activate Ms

emergency equipment Officer Perez' failure to activate this equipment in effect keeps his
dashboard video camera from activating as well.
10,

As Officer Perez pursues the suspect vehicle by heading north on 2700 West

Officer Nichols continues his pursuit of the suspect vehicle to a residential neighborhood to the
northeast of the intersection at 7000 South 3200 west During this pursuit, the suspect vehicle
loops back south in the direction of 7800 South, again driving on 3200 West, During this time,
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Officer Nichols wouldfrequentlycall out the location and direction of travel of the suspect
vehicle.
11.

Officer Perez monitors Officer Nichols5 description of his pursuit and eventually

decides to head west on7800 South,from2700 West, OfBeer Perez stops his patrol vehicle
when he is approximately half-way between 2700 West and 3200 West Streets. Coincidentally,
the suspect vehicle opts to head east on 7800 Southfrom3200 West? straight in the direction of
Officer Perez. Officer Perez spots the approaching suspect vehicle, activates his overhead
emergency lights and positions his vehicle in the middle erf 7800 South Street. The suspect
vehicle disregards Officer Perez7 vehicle and continues east on 7800 South Street Officer Perez
neglects to activate his siren at the time he activates his emergency lights.
12.

Officer Perez reverses the direction of his vehicle as the suspect vehicle continues

. eastbound on 7800 South Street. Officer Nichols remains close behind the suspect vehicle in his
pursuit of the same. The suspect vehicle enters the intersection of 7800 South 2700 West and
turns north as Officer Perez pursues the suspect vehicle, behind Officer Nichols, and turns north
in this intersection as well. Officer Perez emergency siren remains off as he proceeds through
this intersection,
13.

By operation of the traffic control devices at this intersection, Officer Perez did

not have therightof way to enter the intersection. Thus, immediately before Officer Perez enters
the intersection, a vehicle headed northbound on 2700 West travels through the intersection and
immediately pulls over to allow Officer Perez through on 2700 West, No other vehicles entered
the intersection at 2700 West 7800 South as Officer Perez proceeded through the same. Officer
Perez initiated his siren sometime shortly after proceeding through the intersection.
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14.

Further description of the facts leading to the termination of Officer Perez' pursuit

is not warranted. From testimony offered by Chief Shepherd, South Jordan City has represented
that after Officer Perez proceeded through the intersection at 2700 West 7800 South and
activated all emergency equipment, specifically his emergency siren, all subsequent actions
taken by Officer Perez complied with South Jordan City Vehicle Pursuit Policy and Utah Law.

ANALYSIS
L

Sufficient Evidence Exists to support the allegation that Officer Perez violated the
South Jordan Police Department Policy and Procedures Manual, Chapter 26,1.1
Code of Conduct Regulation 7 ~ Unsatisfactory Performance, and Chapter 26,1.1
Code of Conduct Regulation 42 - Performance of Duty.

As Officer Perez operated his police patrol vehicle from the intersection of 9435 South
2700 West and to the point where he proceeds through the intersection of 7800 South 2700 West,
Officer Perez violated The South Jordan City Vehicle Pursuit Policy and Utah Code Ann. § 416a-212 in several respects. While testifying before the Board, Officer Perez admitted that his
failure to activate a siren while turning left at the intersection of 7800 South 2700 West was a
violation of policy. Specifically, we find Officer Perez failure to initiate a siren before entering
this intersection constituted a neglectful oversight, which resulted in a violation of Regulation 42
under Chapter 26, LL of the South Jordan Police Department's Policy and Procedure Manual.
Therefore, the Board will not discuss this violation further here, but in context of whether the
decision to terminate Officer Perez is proportionate to his policy violations (below).
Officer Perez disputed whether his act of speeding northbound on 2700 West violated
City Policy or the Traffic Code. This issue is related to the question of whether Officer Perez'
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act of speeding required him to activate emergency .equipment while doing so. Therefore, this
activity will be fully discussed in this Section.
The Board has determined that Officer Perez failed to initiate either emergency overhead
lights or siren while traveling northbound on 2700 West (from 9435 South), and this failure
facially violates the Traffic Code. During this leg of Officer Perez' pursuit, he operated his
patrol vehicle at speeds of over 70 miles per hour. The posted speed limit for 2700 West is 35
miles per hour.
The Board notes that at the time Officer Perez was traveling northbound on 2700 west,
from 9435 South, Officer Perez could have lawfully exceeded the speed limit under the Traffic
Code. Utah Code Ann.§ 41~6a-212 (2) states, "The opersitor of an authorized emergency vehicle
may .... (c) exceed the maximum speed limits, unless proliibited by a local highway authority
under Section 41~6a~2G8," However, this statute does not give officers unbridled discretion to
exceed the speed limit An officer's authority to exceed a, posted speed limit is limited to
specific instances of law enforcement activity. In the present case. Officer Perez was authorized
to exceed maximum speed limits because he was "hi the pursuit of an actual or suspected
violator of the law." Utah Code Ann. § 41~6a~212 (2) (b>
While Officer Perez was authorized to exceed the .speed.limit under Utah law, he was
also required under the statute to undertake specific measures to protect the safety of the public
while in pursuit of the suspect Utah Code Ann. § 41 -6a-212 (4) allows an officer in pursuit to
exceed the speed limit "only when: (a) the operator of the vehicle: (i) Sounds and audible signal
under Section 41 -6a-1625; and (it) uses a visual signal with emergency lights ..." Emphasis
added. The Board finds that: 1) officer Perez was in pursuit of the suspect vehicle when he was
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speeding northbound on 2700 West Street; and 2) during this pursuit, he failed to comply with §
41~6a~212 (4) when he failed to initiate traffic lights or a siren,
Before reaching this conclusion, the Board carefully considered Officer Perez5 argument
that he was not required to initiate emergency equipment during this segment of events on May
28,2009. Officer Perez asserts that he was not required to initiate any emergency equipment as
he proceeded northbound on 2700 West at a speed of 70 miles per hour. Officer Perez5 argues
that he was not engaged in a pursuit at the time he exceeded the speed limit. His argument is
based in part on his belief that his proximity to the suspect was too remote to be fairly considered
a pursuit under Utah law. Therefore, Officer Perez asserts his driving in excess of the speed
limit to catch a distant suspect is better characterized as "normal patrolling activities with the
purpose of identifying and apprehending violators,3' Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-212 (3) (b). If
Officer Perez' interpretation of the Traffic Code is correct, then he has not violated the Traffic
Code because he "may exceed the speed limit when engaged in normal patrolling activities with
the purpose of identifying and apprehending violators." Id,
The Board believes that acceptance of Officer Perez' interpretation of the traffic code
would create an exception under Utah Code Ann. § 4.1-6a-212 (3) (b), which swallows the rule
under § 41~6a~212 (4). It is important to note that by the time Officer Perez is proceeding
northbound, the Suspect Vehicle has come dangerously close to running over Officer Perez,
This event created probable cause that the suspect had committed a forcible felony under Utah
law. Therefore, Officer Perez5 response to this event is well beyond the ken of "normal
patrolling activities* contemplated under § 41-6a-212 (4). If Officer Perez* interpretation of the
traffic code is correct, then the Board cannot fathom when a pursuit could ever occur, as opposed
to a "normal patrolling activity."
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Moreover, if the Board accepted the notion that Officer Perez' was too remotefromthe
suspect to be considered "in pursuit," at the time he sped north on 2700 West, then his
remotenessfromthe suspect would equally prevent the Boardfromconcluding that his speeding
was done in the course of formal patrolling activity/' This would lead the Board to conclude
that there is no basis for Officer Pereztoviolate traffic lasvs while northbound on 2700 West
The Board notes that neither of the terms, "in pursuit" nor "norma! patrolling activity" is
fully defined in the Traffic Code. Therefore, the Traffic Code offers no guidance on when
proximity of the suspect to a pursuing police officer necessarily ends the pursuit of the suspect,
or if the suspect's distancefromthe officer renders the officer's pursuit to be "normal patrolling
activity.'* However, wre believe the South Jordan City Veldcle Pursuit Policy defines a
'"Vehicular Pursuit" to include the activities of Officer Perez at the time he sped north on 2700
West Street
South Jordan City Vehicle Pursuit Policy §41.2.2, Definition No. 21, casts a broad net
over the sorts of activities which constitute a vehicular pursuit This term is defined to mean "an
active attempt by a law enforcement officer in an authorized emergency vehicle to apprehend
fleeing suspect(s) who are attempting to avoid apprehension through evasive tactics." ML The
Board notes that the proximity of the officer to the suspect is not a factor in determining whether
an officer's activity constitutes a pursuit Simply put, if an officer's action constitutes "active
attempt... to apprehendfleeingsuspect(s)" then he is in pursuit. Officer Perez testified that
while speeding northbound on 2700 West, his intended purpose was to apprehend the suspect in
this case. Therefore, the South Jordan City Vehicle Pursuit Policy would hold Officer Perez
speeding northbound on 2700 south to be a "pursuit" Thisfindingin turn requires Officer Perez
to activate lights and sirenunder the traffic Code. Failure to do so constituted a facial violation
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ofthe Traffic Code, and South Jordan City's vehicle pursuit policy. This violation in turn
amounts to unsatisfactory performance of his duties under Regulation 7 of the Sough Jordan
Policy Department Policy and Procedures Manual.

II.

THE SEVERITY OF OFFICER PEREZ' DISCIPLINE -TERMINATION- IS NOT
DISPROPORTIONATE TO HIS CONDUCT ON THE DATE OF MAY 28, 2009,
WHEN EXAMINED TOGETHER WITH OFFICER PEREZ5 DISCIPLINARY
RECORD.
A. Turning Left Through the Intersection of 7800 South 2700 West Without Activating
An Emergency Siren Was More Significant Than a Mere Technical Violation,
From the outset, Officer Perez argues that the only clear violation of South Jordan City's

vehicle pursuit policy occurred when Officer Perez turned left through the intersection of 7800
South 2700 West without first activating his siren. Officer Perez characterizes this incident as a
mere technical violation which does not warrant severe discipline. The Board may he inclined to
agree with Officer Perez' characterization of this event if the Board simply counted the seconds
from the moment the suspect vehicle drove past officer Perez, to the point where Officer Perez
activated his emergency siren. The time span which elapsed from the moment Officer Perez
should have initiated his siren to the moment he did activate the same is not the sole issue to
consider in weighing the severity of this misconduct. The Board cannot overlook the fact that
during this brief period of time, Officer Perez' failure to initiate his emergency siren occurred
when he needed it most: as he proceeded into an intersection when intersecting traffic had the
right of way.

This failure enhanced the degree of danger -posed to the public, and therefore

cannot be considered a mere technical violation of policy
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Officer Perez also does not consider this violation as cumulative in relation to his other
failures to follow South Jordan City's vehicle pursuit policy on the night of May 28, 2009,
because he did not believe his prior act of speeding without activating emergency lights or siren
to violate South Jordan vehicle pursuit policy. The Board finds Officer Perez committed not
one but three separate instances of misconduct during the pursuit of May 28, 2009. Therefore,
wefindthese instances to be significant

B. Disciplinary History.
In his letter to Officer Perez, dated November 12., 2009, Chief Shepherd notes that
Officer Perez has been found to violate policy on three separate occasions prior to his violation
ofpoliciesonthedateof May 28,2009. During the hearing, Chief Shepherd opined that Officer
Perez* history of misconduct while operating a vehicle shows a pattern of poor judgment, which
has not improved despite his training. These separate instances of misconduct warrant some
discussion because they formed apart of Chief Shepherd's basis to terminate Officer Perez5
employment
On April 1,2008, Officer Perez willfully engaged m a pursuit of a speeding vehicle. This
pursuit violated South Jordan vehicle pursuit policy in several respects, including: travelling at
an excessive speed through at least one intersection when required by policy to stop;
continuation of pursuit when policy called for Officer Perez to disengage from the same; and
operation of an unmarked vehicle at speeds of over 100 miles per hour. During the course of this
pursuit, an accident occurred where three people were severely injured. Two of the three injured
persons were innocent travelers, who were struckfiombeliind by the vehicle whieh Officer
Perez had pursued. During the Board hearing of May 26,2010, the facts of this event were
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fully vetted by the parties; however, the events on this date were not before the Board to consider
whether Officer Perez" conduct on this occasion violated South Jordan City Department Policies.
We therefore summarily accept in this Ruling that on April 1,2008, Officer Perez's pursuit of
another vehicle was conducted in a manner which violated policies and procedures governing
vehicle pursuits by South Jordan Police Officers.
Officer Perez' discipline for the events of April 1,2008 included a 30 day suspension
without pay, and loss of vehicle take home privileges for 60 days. In addition, Officer Perez was
directed to receive remedial training on department policies relating to vehicle pursuits, and
further required to develop and conduct departmental in-service training on vehicle pursuit
policy.
On July 3,2008, Officer Perez was nearly terminated for a lack of veracity during a
supervisor's inquiry and subsequent investigation. The facts of this event support the conclusion
that Officer Perez was not honest with a supervising officer when questioned about whether he
had taken a vote from officers under his supervision to determine if they favored a proposal to
change work schedules. In lieu of termination, Officer Perez was demotedfromthe rank of
Sergeant to Senior Patrol Officer. Officer Perez was also advised that this evmt would be kept
permanently in his personnelfile,and any further violation of South Jordan City policy would
result in his termination.
On May 23,2009, Officer Perez was discovered to have operated his vehicle at an
excessive speed of 83 miles perhour while responding to a report of a noise complaint The
nature of this complaint did not warrant breaking speed limits in order to respond. Officer Perez
was verbally counseled for this incident by his immediate supervisor* It is not known to the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,14
may contain errors.

Board as to why this incident did not undergo further review, in light of Officer Perez' warning
that he would be terminated for any other violations of South Jordan City policy.
While addressing the history of discipline against him, Officer Perez's argument raises
two separate issues, First, Officer Perez believes termination at this point of his career is
excessive, because it is the next step on a path of progressive discipline which was built upon an
excessive punishment imposed for the incident of April 1,2008. Officer Perez believes
excessive discipline was imposed on this date because that decision rested on improper
references to prior acts of misconduct which Officer Perez purgedfromhis disciplinary record,
with approval of the South Jordan Police Department
In support of this position, Officer Perez offers as evidence a Memorandum to Chief
Shepherd which documents an occasion on April 24,2005, wherein Officer Perez was found to
have operated his vehicle at a speed of 73 miles per hour, in excess of the posted speed limit of
45 miles Per Hour. (See Exhibit No. 11, submitted by Officer Perez.) This incident resulted in
his pursuit by a patrol officer, and was eventually stopped for-speeding. The memorandum of
May 17,2005 contains a discussion about another incident which occurred on March 15? 2000,
wherein Officer Perez was found to be operating a personal vehicle at a rate of speed which
"drewr the attention" of a traffic officer, and caused him to pursue and stop Officer Perez. (See
Exhibits 11 and 10, submitted by Officer Perez.) The memorandum of May 17,2005 should not
have discussed the event of March 15,2000 because documentation of this event was purged
from Officer Perez personnelfileand therefore could not tie used against him in subsequent
disciplinary proceedings.
Similarly, Officer Perez5 speeding on April 24 2005 was lightly discussed in a
Memorandum to Chief Shepherd which recommends disciplineforthe occasion on April 1., 2008
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where Officer Perez improperly pursued a vehicle which eventually crashed. (See Exhibit No.
12, submitted by Officer Perez). Importantly, this memorandum states^ "Sgt. Perez does have a
disciplinary action that resulted in a 10 day suspension. This action is no longer active in his file
however it is just short of being two years ago. Due to its Removal it is not clear as to the
specifics of his past suspension." From this passage, Officer Perez invites the Board to
conclude that his discipline would have been less severe for the April 1,2008 incident if Exhibit
No. 12 had contained no improper reference to prior discipline. The Board declines to accept
this inference fiom the evidence. The board believes that the tenn suspension imposed on
Officer Perez for his involvement in the pursuit of April 1,2008 was warranted, regardless of
whether an improper reference to prior misconduct was discussed in a memorandum/to Chief
Shepherd.
Moreover* Officer Perez' argument that Chief Shepherd's decision to terminate him is
tainted by excessive discipline imposed for the occasion of April 1,2008 fails for the simple
reason that the Board cannot find any evidence thefinaldecisiontoimpose a 30 days suspension
for the April 1,2008 incident relied on any previous discipline of Officer Perez. Exhibit No, 23
submitted by South Jordan City, documents the disciplinary action taken against Officer Perez
for the April 1,2008 incident. This document appears to be some sort of a form document which
shows a "place-holder" to insert the previous disciplinary record of Officer Perez. Importantly,
this portion of the document is left blank. Therefore, the Board cannot conclude that the final
decision to suspend Officer Perez for 30 days relied on any disciplinary history which was
officially purged.
Finally, Officer Perez next argues that termination of his employment is excessive, in
light of the instances where other officers employed by the South Jordan Police Department have
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operated their assigned vehicles in violation of South Jordan City Policies. Some of these
instances of misconduct resulted in vehicular accidents,, hut very few of these instances of
misconduct resulted in severe discipline. In support of this position, Officer Perez submitted a
summary chart which only generally describes 25 separate instances of improper vehicle
operation. (See: Exhibit 14? submitted by Officer Perez). The Board identifies that two officers
received sever discipline on this chart. Officer Phillips received a two day suspension, Officer
Johnson was terminated, and Officer Barfuss appears to have resigned after his second traffic
accident resulted in the loss of driving privileges for one year.
The Board concludes that the information contained in this chart at most suggests Officer
Perez could have received discipline which is excessive and inconsistent with discipline meted
out to other officers. However, this chart was submitted without any additional evidence, such as
testimony folly describing any of the traffic incidents described in Exhibit 14. Standing alone,
Exhibit 14 does not enable the Board to conclude Perez argument is supported by a
preponderance of evidence.
Having found the issues raised by Officer Perez to not support the conclusion that Chief
Shepherd's decision to terminate him was excessive, fhe Board now applies the guiding
principles described in the Qgden City (Supra) to the present case. The board concludes that the
evidence presented to the Board at hearing establishes an example of "dishonesty, [and] a series
of violations accompanied by apparently ineffective progressive discipline.53 Q&den City, 2005
UT App 274, PI 8. We therefore believe that the Board caanot conclude Chief Shepherd abused
his discretion in electing to terminate Officer Perez employment with South Jordan City.
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CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The Board hereby concludes the conduct of Officer Perez during the course of a hi$t
speed pursuit on the date of May 28,2009 violated Regdations 7 and 42 of the South Jordan
PoEce Department Policy and Procedures Manual, After considering the instances of
misconduct which occurred on May 28,2009, together with Officer Perez disciplinary history
from the date of April 1,2008, the Board concludes that Chief Shepherd did not abuse his
discretion in electing to terminate Officer Perez employment with South Jordan City, Rather, the
Board concludes that the decision to terminate Officer Perez is well supported by the facts of the
May 28,2009 pursuit, when in viewed in light of Officer Perez disciplinary history.
This Decision and Order is approved by the Board following vote by secret ballot which
occurred on the Date of May 27,2010. The signatures of the Board found on this Decision and
Order establish the Board's approval of the basis for its decision, without acknowledging the
vote of any particular Board Member.
The Board hereby affirms the decision of Chief Shepherd to terminate Officer Perez'
employment with South Jordan City, The Board requests the City Recorder certify this decision
in accordance with, the South Jordan City Employee Handbook.

Dated this 7^ day of June, 2010

SOUTH JORDAN CTTY RMPTXTYEE APPEAT/BOARD

0*>etft4
Board Member
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* • W. Kent Money, Mayor
Brian Butters, Council Member
Kathie L Johnson, Council Member
Larry Short, Council Member
Aleta Taylor, CoundA Member
Leona Winger, Council Member

SOUTH JORDAN

John H. Geilmann, Cffy Manager
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PH: 801.254.3742 EMAIL- info@sjc.utah.gov FAX: 801,254.3393

June 10,2010
Ryan B. Hancey
Scott S. Bridge
Kesler & Rust
68 South Main Street, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
CarnilleK Johnson
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000
Re: Employee Appeals Board Certified Decision for Brett Perez v. South Jordan City
Dear Mr. Hancey & Ms. Johnson,
Enclosed is a copy of the official Certified Decision & Order of the Employee Appeals Board
Hearing held May 26,2010 for Brett Perez v. South Jordan City that was delivered to my office
today, June 10,2010.
Section 4-06(5)e(4) of the South Jordan Employee Handbook states, "anyfinal action or order of
the hoard may be appealed by either the employee or the City to the Utah Court of Appeals by
filing with that court a notice of appeal no later than 30 days from the date ofthe issuance of the
final action or order ofthe board"
Sincerely,

Anna M. West
City Recorder, CMC
Cc:

Mr. Brett Perez
John H. Geilmann, City Manager
L Rob Wall, City Attorney
South Jordan Employee Appeals Board Members

1600 WEST TOWNE CENTER DRIVE

SOUTH JORDAN, UTAH 84095
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Westlaw,
U.C.A. 1953 § 10-3-1106

Page 1

West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code
* ! Chapter 3. Municipal Government
* ! Part 11. Personnel Rules and Benefits
- • - • § 10-3-1106. Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer-Appeals—Board—Procedure

(1) An employee to which Section 10-3-1105 applies may not be discharged, suspended without pay, or involuntarily transferred to a position with less remuneration:

(a) because of the employee's politics or religious belief; or

(b) incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing body, or heads of departments.

(2)(a) If an employee is discharged, suspended for more than two days without pay, or involuntarily transferred
from one position to another with less remuneration for any reason, the employee may, subject to Subsection
(2)(b), appeal the discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer to a board to be known as the appeal board, established under Subsection (7).

(b) If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee shall exhaust the employee's
rights under that grievance procedure before appealing to the board.

(3)(a) Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written notice of the appeal with the municipal
recorder within 10 days after:

(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee receives notice of the final
disposition of the municipality's internal grievance procedure; or

(ii) if the municipality does not provide an internal grievance procedure, the discharge, suspension, or involuntary transfer.

(b)(i) Upon the filing of an appeal under Subsection (3)(a), the municipal recorder shall forthwith refer a copy
of the appeal to the appeal board.

(ii) Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal board shall forthwith commence its
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investigation, take and receive evidence, and fully hear and determine the matter which relates to the cause
for the discharge, suspension, or transfer.
(4) An employee who is the subject of the discharge, suspension, or transfer may:
(a) appear in person and be represented by counsel;
(b) have a public hearing;
(c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered; and
(d) examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board.
(5)(a)(i) Each decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be certified to the recorder within
15 days from the date the matter is referred to it, except as provided in Subsection (5)(a)(ii).
(ii) For good cause, the board may extend the 15-day period under Subsection (5)(a)(i) to a maximum of 60
days, if the employee and municipality both consent.
(b) If it finds in favor of the employee, the board shall provide that the employee shall receive:
(i) the employee's salary for the period of time during which the employee is discharged or suspended
without pay; or
(ii) any deficiency in salary for the period during which the employee was transferred to a position of less
remuneration.
(6)(a) A final action or order of the appeal board may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals by filing with that
court a petition for review.
(b) Each petition under Subsection (6)(a) shall be filed within 30 days after the issuance of the final action or
order of the appeal board.
(c) The Court of Appeals' review shall be on the record of the appeal board and for the purpose of determining
if the appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded its authority.
(7)(a) The method and manner of choosing the members of the appeal board, the number of members, the designation of their terms of office, and the procedure for conducting an appeal and the standard of review shall be
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prescribed by the governing body of each municipality by ordinance.
(b) For a municipality operating under a form of government other than a council-mayor form under Chapter
3b, Part 2, Council-Mayor Form of Municipal Government, an ordinance adopted under Subsection (7)(a) may
provide that the governing body of the municipality shall serve as the appeal board.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1977, c. 48, § 3; Laws 2004, c. 260, § 2, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 2008, c. 19, § 11, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws
2008, c. 115, § 1, eff. May 5, 2008.
Current through 2011 Third Special Session.
(C) 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
END OF DOCUMENT
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City of South Jordan
4-06 EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE
4-06 (1)

General Policy - It is the responsibility of all employees to observe rules
of conduct necessary for the proper operation of City government.
Administrative procedures have been established for the handling of
disciplinary measures when required.

4-06 (2)

Causes for Disciplinary Action - Causes for disciplinary action, up to and
including termination, may include, but are not limited to the following:
a.

Violation of the laws of the United States, the State of Utah, or
ordinances of the City of South Jordan or any other jurisdiction
determined to be job related.
(1)

A conviction (including a plea in abeyance or no contest)
for the violation of any criminal law shall be prima facie
evidence in any City hearing process.

(2)

Violation may also be established in any City hearing
process under an administrative standard of whether the
evidence shows moire likely than not the violation occurred
regardless of the pendency or dismissal of criminal charges.

b.

Violation of the code of conduct.

c.

Conduct which endangers the peace and safety of others or poses a
threat to the public interest.

d.

Any behavior by an employee deemed inappropriate or disruptive
to the work environment which may affect the ability of other
employees to perform effectively.

e.

Misconduct.

f.

Malfeasance. (The performance of an act which is legally
unjustified or conflicts with the law or City-policy).

g.

Misfeasance. (The wrongful performance of a normally lawful
act.)

h.

Nonfeasance. (The omission of some act which ought to have
been performed.)

i.

Incompetence.

j.

Negligence.

Employee Handbook
Employee Conduct
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Section Four
4.18

City of South Jordan

4-06 (3)

k.

Insubordination.

1.

Failure to maintain skills.

m.

Inadequate performance of duties.

n.

Unauthorized or excessive absence or tardiness.

o.

Falsification or unauthorized alteration of records.

p.

Violation of City or department policies.

q.

Falsification of employment application.

r.

Discrimination.

s.

Sexual harassment or prohibited sexual conduct.

t

Retaliation.

u.

Misrepresentation (making false statements or knowingly allowing
false statements or false impressions to be accepted as valid in the
course of the employee's job related duties).

v.

Theft or removal of any City property, or the property of any
employee from the work premises without proper authorization.

w.

Gambling or engaging in a lottery on City property.

x.

Failure of a public safety employee to maintain physical
fitness/ability standards.

y.

Inability to perform essential job duties, with or without reasonable
accommodation.

z.

Any other action or behavior contrary to the best interests of the
City.

Types of Disciplinary Action - The following are not written in
progressive order and are not to be deemed a progressive disciplinary
scheme or system:
a.

Verbal Warning - A verbally communicated warning to an
employee by a supervisor for a minor work behavior deficiency.
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b.

Written Reprimand - A formal written notice outlining work
performance deficiencies and required corrective action, to an
employee by a supervisor for disciplinary purposes, which is
documented in the employee's personnel file.

c.

Suspension - An employee may be suspended from work with or
without pay for up to 30 days (240 hours) by a Department
Director. For any suspension of more than two day (16 hours), the
City shall first conduct a pre-disciplinary hearing as outlined in 406 (4), except for appointed, at-will, and probationary employees.

d.

Demotion - An employee may be demoted to a lower grade
position with or without a reduction in pay by a Department
Director. If the demotion is also an involuntary transfer to a
position with less remuneration, the City shall first conduct a predisciplinary hearing as outlined in 4-06 (4), except for appointed,
at-will, and probationary employees.

e.

Transfer - An employee may be transferred to another position
within a department by a Department Director. An employee may
be transferred to another position in a different department within
the City with approval of the City Manager. If the transfer is an
involuntary transfer with less remuneration, the City shall first
conduct a pre-disciplinary hearing as outlined in 4-06 (4), except
for appointed, at-will, and probationary employees.

f.

Termination - A full-time employee may be terminated by a
Department Director after consultation with the City Manager or
designee and the Legal Office. The City shall first conduct a predisciplinary hearing as outlined in 4-06 (4), except for appointed,
at-will, and probationary employees. All other employees may be
terminated at the discretion of Department Directors. A hearing is
not required.

g.

Employees whose conduct constitutes grounds for discipline may
be subject to one or more of the foregoing disciplinary actions
depending on the severity of the improper conduct. The City
reserves the right to impose disciplinary action, up to and including
termination on a first offense, depending on the nature and severity
of the improper conduct.
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Pre-Disciplinary Hearing - Whenever a full-time employee who is not an
appointed, at-will, or probationary employee, is subject to possible
suspension without pay for more than two days (16 hours), demotion or
involuntary transfer from one position to another with less remuneration,
or termination, a pre-disciplinary hearing shall be held prior to imposing
disciplinary action.
a.

The employee shall be given written notice of the hearing, prior to
the hearing, which will include an explanation of the charges
against the employee and notice that discipline, up to and including
termination, will be considered.

b.

The pre-disciplinary hearing shall be conducted by the employee's
Department Director or designee for the purpose of allowing the
employee to respond to the charges and present information the
employee believes is relevant to the decision.

c.

A decision as to the disciplinary action to be taken, if any, shall be
made by the Department Director or designee, and the employee
shall be notified in writing within five working days after the
hearing. This written notification shall include:

d.

1)

The grounds for disciplinary action.

2)

Any disciplinary action to be imposed.

3)

The effective date and duration of the disciplinary action.

4)

Any required corrective action necessary for the employee
to avoid further disciplinary action.

5)

Notice and a copy of the post-disciplinary hearing process
outlined in 4-06 (5), if the imposed disciplinary action is
termination, a suspension of more than two days (16
hours), or demotion or involuntary transfer from one
position to another with less remuneration.

Waiver of Pre-Disciplinary Hearing
An employee may waive the right to a Pre-Disciplinary Hearing.
Such waiver must be in writing, signed by the employee, and
specifically acknowledge that the employee has received a copy
and read the requirements of 4-06, accepts the proposed discipline,
and acknowledges that the waiver also applies to the right to
appeal to the Appeal Board.
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Appeal Board (10-3-1106, UCA)
a.

A full-time employee, who is not an appointed, at-will, or probationary
employee, may use the post-disciplinary hearing process. Appeals to the
Appeal Board shall be taken by filing written notice of the appeal with the
City Recorder within ten days of receipt of the notice of the imposition of
the suspension of more than two days (16 hours), demotion or involuntary
transfer from one position to another with less remuneration, or
termination, ten days from the receipt of notice by the City Manager or
designee.

b.

The Appeal Board shall consist of three members. The City
Manager, at his or her discretion, may appoint his or her self,
Assistant City Managers, or Department Directors as Appeal
Board members.

c.

Exhaustion of Internal Grievance Procedures
The City designates the Appeal Board as the only internal postdisciplinary appeal procedure for terminations, suspensions
without pay for more than two days (16 hours), demotions or an
involuntarily transfer from one position to another with less
remuneration.

d.

Appeal Hearing Process
1)

The employee shall be entitled to appear in person before
the Appeals Board and to be represented by counsel (at the
employee's expense), to have a public hearing, to confront
the witnesses whose testimony is to be considered, to
present the employee's own witnesses, to receive and
present evidence, and to examine the evidence to be
considered by the Appeals Board.

2)

The Appeals Board determines the admissibility of
evidence and its use. Further, the Appeals Board is not
bound by the rules of evidence and may consider any
evidence it determines relevant to the matter.

3)

The City Recorder records and takes minutes of each
session, except for the Appeal Board's deliberations.

4)

The City Attorney or designee represents the City's
interests.

Employee Handbook
Employee Conduct
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Effective Date: 6/15/10
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Section Four
All

City of South Jordan

e.

5)

The standard of review is an administrative standard of
whether the evidence shows that it is more likely than not
that the findings and action taken by the Department
Director are supported.

6)

The Appeals Board may establish hearing procedures
consistent with 10-3-1106, UCA, and may modify those
procedures at the hearing as may be equitable and
conducive to a determination of the issues.

Decision of Appeals Board Hearing
1)

Each decision of the Appeal Board shall be by secret ballot.

2)

Each decision of the Appeals Board shall be certified to the
City Recorder within 15 days from the date the matter was
referred to it by the City Recorder; however, upon consent
of both the employee and the City, the Appeals Board may
extend the 15 day period to a maximum of 60 days.

3)

In the event the appeals board does not uphold the action of
the Department Director, the City Recorder shall certify the
decision to the employee affected, and to the City Manager
and Department Director. If the Board does not uphold the
suspension, demotion or termination, the board shall
provide in its order

4)

4-06 (6)

a)

the employee shall receive the employee's salary
for the period of time during which the employee
was discharged or suspended without pay,

b)

or that the employee be paid any deficiency in
salary for the period during which the employee
was demoted or involuntarily transferred to a
position of less remuneration.

Any final action or order of the Board may be submitted for
review by either the employee or the City to the Utah Court
of Appeals by filing a petition for review no later than 30
days from the date of the issuance of the final action or
order of the Appeals Board.

Requests to Purge Disciplinary Records - An employee may submit a
written request to have prior disciplinary records purged to the City
Manager.
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c.

a.

The employee must wait a minimum of two years before a request
will be considered. Requests will only be considered if there have
been no intervening disciplinary actions.

b.

The City Manager shall consider the request within 10 working
days of receipt.

All decisions shall be at the sole discretion of the City Manager or designee.
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